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1． Introduction
In the previous paper（Aono（2015））, we integrated a land asset market into the
economic growth model and examined the characteristics of the steady state growth
path. In this paper, we examine the stability of the long-run steady state path, and
consider the paths which do not converge to the long-run steady state in greater
detail.1）
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section2 outlines the basic
structure of the model, and derives the dynamic equations of the economy. Section
3 examines the stability of the equilibrium path, and considers the paths which do
not converge to the long-run steady state in greater detail. Section4 considers the
link between credit, collateral, land prices and capital accumulation. Section5
considers what we could learn from the Japanese experience from1986 to2003, the
Japanese experience in the period of“bubble economy”and the period of“lost
decade”. Section6summarizes the main results and discusses possible extensions.
* Former Professor/Matsuyama University, Dr. Economics（Kobe University）
1）This paper is a revised version of Aono（1976）. In this paper we mainly focus on the
stability of the equilibrium path, and consider the paths which do not converge to the long-run
steady state in greater detail.
2． Model
2．1．The basic model
The basic model and notation in this section are as follows.
⒜ Technology.
Output, Y is a function of inputs of labor, N , capital, K , and land, L . The
production function for this output is twice differential, homogeneous of degree one,
in addition, it has the following properties : ⅰ positive and diminishing marginal
productivities of the three factors, ⅱ impossibility of any product without one of the
factors. Technical change is assumed to be land-augmenting and labor-augmenting.
The rate of land-augmenting technical progress and the rate of labor-augmenting
technical progress are denoted as h and , respectively. The above assumptions are
summarized by
 ⑴
 ⑵
 ⑶
⒝ The supply of land and labor.
Land is assumed to be fixed in supply, and labor is assumed to grow at the
given exponential rate, n . Thus the sum of the rate of labor-augmenting technical
progress and the rate of growth of labor is . We assume that the following
conditions are satisfied.




: constant ⑷
 ⑸
 ⑹
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⒞ Land asset market
Now consider a portfolio equation which determines the price of land. For
analytical simplicity, we assume that there exists a perfect land asset market.
Portfolio equilibrium requires that alternative investment options yield the same net
rate of return. Since capital is the only asset other than land, and since these two
assets have the same risk properties under the assumption of a perfect land asset
market, we obtain the following equilibrium condition ;






 ⑺
where P is the price of land in terms of goods,  is the expected change of land
prices,  is the expected rent of land, and  is the expected rate of return on
capital. The equation ⑺ tells us that the land asset market is in equilibrium when
the expected rate of increase in land prices,  plus the expected rent-price
ratio, are equal to the expected rate of return on capital, .
For simplicity, we assume that expected and actual price changes are identical,
i. e.






 ⑻
It is important to consider the implications and the limitations of the equation
⑺ and ⑻. We do not assume that landowners have a long-run perfect foresight
because they do not know what will happen in the long and distant future. We
assume that landowners adjust their expectations instantaneously for analytical
simplicity.
⒟ Consumption function and savings function
We now consider the consumption function, and hence the savings function.
We shall assume that landowners can consume or save out of capital gains on land.
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We also assume a generalized Cambridge savings function instead of a proportional
savings function. For analytical simplicity, we assume that workers do not own
their land, and that they do not have to pay the rental rate of land to landowners.2）
If landowners save a constant fraction of capital gains on land, then, the
consumption function is
	




with  

 ⑼
where : the saving rate of capitalists（entrepreneurs）out of profits,  : the
saving rate of workers, 
: the saving rate of landowners out of rents, 
: the
saving rate of landowners out of capital gains on land. : the rate of depreciated
capital. r : the net rate of return on capital, R : the real wage rate, : the rental
rate of land.
Since total output, Y is equal to consumption, C plus capital depreciation, ,
plus net investment, , we get
 ⑽
Substituting ⑼ into ⑽ yields
		




with  

 ⑾
⒠ Determination of factor prices.
Given R , and the production function which is homogeneous of degree one
2）In the previous paper（Aono（2015））, we implicitly assumed that rents payed by workers are
reinvested in land and that they are directed to the maintenance cost of land. In this paper, we
assume that workers do not have to pay the rental rate of land. The results are almost the same.
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（exhibits constant returns to scale）, a competitive producer can maximize the net
rate of return on capital when the marginal productivities of capital, , labor, 
and land,  are equal to, R , and respectively. Thus, we get
 ⑿
 ⒀
 ⒁
2．2．Derivation of dynamic equations
It turns out that the dynamics of economy can best be described in terms of the
ratios, 	, 
and .
From the equation ⑴, we obtain



Thus, letting , the production function can be rewritten as a function
of k and u .

 ⒂
Differentiating the above equation with respect to K , and , we get

 ⒃





 ⒄


 ⒅
For analytical simplicity, we shall assume that u is constant. Since 
,
the assumption implies that technical change is of such a character that the rate of
land-augmenting technical progress is equal to the sum of the rate of growth of labor
supply and the rate of labor-augmenting technical progress. Thus, ,  and 
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can be written as a function of k.
Differentiating with respect to time t , we get
 ⒆
where , . Substituting ⑺ and ⑻ into ⒂, and using ⑶, ⑷, ⑸, ⑿
and ⒁, we obtain



	

Using the definition of  and substitute ⒃ and ⒅ into the above
equation, we find
	

 ⒇
We shall now derive . From the definition of 	, we get
		
 21
From ⑾, we obtain
	 

	
 	 

	

Using ⑷, ⑿, ⒀, ⒁,  and , the above equation can
be rewritten as
		








 22
Also, can be rewritten as



	 23
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Substituting 23 into 22 and using ⒃, ⒄ and ⒅, we get








	

	

 24
If we substitute 24 into 21, we obtain

	
 25
The dynamic behavior of the system is described by ⒇ and 25.
3． Properties of the Equilibrium Growth Path
3．1．Stability of the Equilibrium Growth Path
We shall now examine the stability of the equilibrium growth path. The
dynamic behavior of the system can be illustrated in a phase diagram, as in
Figure1. In order to examine the equilibrium growth path, we first derive the 	
curve. From ⒇, we see that 	and 	if and only if
	



 26
It is easily verified that 26 has the following properties.
		
	






 27
	

		 28
and
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

 29
In the case where , . Therefore, in Figure1, along the
vertical line , there is no change in k. Above the  curve, l
increases, below it, l decreases.
We now examine the curve and its properties. From 25, we get the
curve :

							
				
 30
Differentiating 30 with respect to k, we derive the formula for the slope of the
curve :

	
				
	

		
									 31
Since the denominator is positive, it follows that the sign of 31 depends only
upon the numerator. Although the numerator is unsigned, we see that  for
and that the curve meets the k-axis（see 30）. Above the curve,
k decreases, below it, k increases.
The above results enable us to examine some qualitative properties of the
dynamic behavior of the system in theplane. The qualitative behavior of the
possible time paths is illustrated in theplane in Figure1. The movements in
the variables are indicated by arrows. As Figure1 makes clear, the equilibrium
point is a saddle point. Therefore, 


only from
the initial positionslying on the curve labeled AA.
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K＋δ
＝0
l˙＝0
k˙＝0
A
A
B
B
kk*
l
l*
fk(k˜)＝δ＋α＋n
For completeness, we shall show that the equilibrium pointis locally
a saddle point. It is sufficient to prove that
det.  32













 
where


		


		





		



 is the Jacobian of the system ⒇ and 25 evaluated at the equilibrium point
. It is verified that
Figure1. Phase diagram of the dynamic behavior of the system
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det. 	
			
 33
Consequently,
det. 
with  
	
	
Thus we have shown that the equilibrium point 
is locally a saddle
point.
3．2．Properties of the Non-steady State Growth Path
We now consider the paths which do not converge to the long-run steady state
in greater detail. It is seen that the behavior of the possible time paths depends
crucially upon the assumptions on the portfolio equation and the savings function.
We first show that paths starting from the initial positions
lying above
the AA curve approach the point where gross investment goes to zero in finite time.
To see this, we derive the curve. From 24, we obtain the 
curve,


		
	
 34
It is verified that 34 has the following properties.

 35
	

		
	
 36
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Differentiating 34 with respect to k, we derive the formula for the slope of the
curve.





				
							 37
From 37, we see that the slope of the curve is positive for .
curve is indicated by a dashed curve in Figure1 in Section3．1. As
Figure1 indicates, paths starting from any initial positions lying above the
AA curve approach the curve, and thus gross investment goes to zero in
finite time.
Consider now the economic implications of the above results. Our results
depend crucially upon the assumptions on the portfolio equation and the savings
function. Under the assumption of a perfect land asset market with short-run
perfect foresight, if the price of land P , is too high（the rent-price ratio, 
 is too
low）initially, portfolio equilibrium requires that the price of land has to rise faster
than the initial value. Thus the price of land continues to move further from the
initial value. It should be noticed that the instability of land prices is attributed to
the landowners who seek larger capital gains on land.
On the other hand, the effect of land on capital accumulation depends crucially
upon the assumptions on the consumption function, and hence the savings function.
Since we assume that landowners consume a constant fraction of capital gains on
land, the increase in capital gains resulting from the increase in land prices increases
consumption, and eventually consumption exceeds output. Thus the system itself
breaks down. It should be clear that the decline in investment results from the
assumption that landowners consume a constant fraction of capital gains on land.
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Therefore, if all of the capital gains on land are not consumed, the increase in land
prices does not lead to zero-investment.
We have assumed a full employment neoclassical growth model. In the real
world, unemployment exists. A long as the unemployment workers continue to
exist, the increase in land prices coexists with the increase in output. But, as
Stiglitz（2015）states,“if the initial price of land is too high, the price of land
eventually increases super exponentially. As a result, in finite time, the“bubble”
will be“corrected.” But it can be a long time. And even when there is a
“correction”, it may still be on a“bubble path.” The price of land falls, but to a
level still above the convergent path.”（pp .13）
In our neoclassical growth model, If paths start from the initial positions
lying above the AA curve, it is possible that land prices continue to rise,
and that capital accumulation continues to decrease for more than several years.
The asymptotic behavior of the model starting from the initial points 
lying below the AA curve is not evident. However, if we define 

as the root of
	 38
it is easily shown that the point

is not a stable equilibrium point. The point


is the point where the price of land is zero and the rate of return on capital is
positive. But the price of land must be positive because rents are positive and
because the land market is perfect by our assumptions in this section. Thus paths
approaching the point

are not stable.
4． Credit, collateral, land prices and capital accumulation
The model presented in this paper abstracts from Keynesian aggregate demand
effects. We have assumed a full employment neoclassical economy. We also
have ignored the role of the financial system. However, in the real world,
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unemployment exists, and land can be used as collateral. What will happen when
we consider the existence of unemployment and the role of the financial system ?
We shall briefly describe the link between credit, collateral, land prices and capital
accumulation.
When we ignore the role of the financial system and the fact that land can be
used as collateral, the increase in unrealized capital gains on land due to the increase
in land prices may increase consumption, but does not increase capital accumulation.
However, if we consider the role of the financial system and the fact that land can
be used as collateral, an increase in unrealized capital gains on land may be directed
to investment, and in doing so, may influence the real economic activities.
As we mentioned earlier, land is non-reproducible, durable, alterable to other
uses and limited in supply. For these reasons, land serves better as collateral than
other capital goods. The fact that land can be used as collateral may increase the
value of land, but the value associated with the ability to be used as collateral will
depend on the financial system. The banking system provides credit based on
collateral. The demand for land depends itself on the availability of credit.
When an increase in land prices is expected, lending against land collateral
appeared lucrative and safe. Because even when the borrower fails to pay back
their loan, banks can expect to recover the money by selling the land collateral
at prices higher than when the loan was originated（Hoshi（2010）pp .56）. If
banking system provides credit based on collateral, the banks are willing to
lend more to landowners. If the banks are willing to lend more, the price of
land goes up furthermore. In Japan, the inheritance tax on land is assessed at
less than the market value, while what landowners owe in credit is valued at the
market value. Since the Japanese inheritance tax rates are progressive, landowners
who want to bequeath their land to their heirs prefer to borrowing money from the
banks. The facts that land is used as collateral, and that the Japanese inheritance
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tax on land is assessed at less than the market value accelerate the increase in land
prices.
There are two important channels through which the increase in land prices
influences the real economic activities. First, given the propensity to consume out
of capital gains on land, the increase in land prices raises the capital gains, and in
doing so, increases the consumption of landowners. As long as unemployment and
the lack of aggregate demand persist, the increase in consumption raises output and
stimulates the economy. This is called the wealth effect. But, when the economy
reaches a full employment, the increase in consumption due to the rise in the value
of land crowds out capital accumulation, and the capital stock declines, even though
wealth（the capital stock + the value of land）continues to increase.
Second, since land is used as collateral and the banking system provides credit
based on collateral, the increase in the value of land raises credit availability, and,
in doing so, accelerates the increase in land prices. It is the decision of the banks
concerning credit availability that drives the price of land. Thus the increase in the
value of land makes it easy for landowners（entrepreneurs）to finance investment
because the landowners（the entrepreneurs）can use the land with increased value as
additional collateral to borrow more from banks. This is called the collateral effect.
The financial system plays an important role in credit creation. It should be noted
that banks provide credit based on the collateral value of land, not the value of land
itself. Therefore, when the price of land is expected to increase and the collateral
value of land is expected to increase, banks are willing to lend more. On the other
hand, when the price of land is expected to decline sharply and the collateral value
of land is expected to decrease sharply, banks are not willing to lend more. The
wealth effect and collateral effect are put into the reverse gears. The aggregate
demand falls and the economy enters a contraction phase.
As long as unemployment and the lack of aggregate demand persist, an
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increase in credit leading to an increase in the value of land can initially lead to
more investment, and contribute to the expansion of the aggregate demand. But,
when the economy reaches a full employment, increased consumption due to the
increase in the value of land crowds out investment, and investment declines, even
though wealth（the capital stock ＋ the value of land）continues to increase.
A boom or bubble caused by the collateral effect does not last perpetually. As
long as banks expect that a boom continues, the value of land as collateral increases.
And land as collateral accelerates the increase in land prices. But a boom does not
last perpetually. When a boom or bubble collapses, land as collateral accelerates
the decrease in land prices. For these reasons, it may be not so unrealistic to say
that land collateral contributes to volatility of land prices without enhancing long-
term economic performance.
5． Japanese Experience and Lessons from the Experience
5．1．Japanese Experience
Let us consider what we could learn from the Japanese experience from1986 to
2003. From November1986 to February1991, the Japanese economy enjoyed an
expansion that lasted more than4 years. Hoshi（2010）says as follows. “This
expansion was characterized by extraordinary appreciation of asset prices, especially
stock and land prices.” Many people call this period of the Japanese economy
“bubble economy”（pp .51）.
According to Land Price Index published by the Japan Real Estate Research
Institute, the average urban land price index rose from around90（89．0）in1984 to
about150（147．8）by the peak in1991. （The value of the indices is normalized to
be100 for March2000.） The land prices fell gradually over the next12 years or
so, and in2005urban land price index was around70（69．1）. By2005, land lost
more than50％ of the peak value on average. The Commercial Land Price Index
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rose from around105（104．9）in1984 to around195（195．5）by the peak in1991,
and fell to around60（60．6）in2005. It lost more than2/3 of the peak value.
From1991to2007, the economy stagnated, recording a couple of spells of negative
growth. Many people call this period of the Japanese economy“lost decade”.
From the view point of the behavior of land prices,“bubble economy”and
“lost decade”are characterized not by the fact that the increase in land prices in
“bubble economy”was high, but by the fact that the land prices fell gradually over
the next12 years. Many people assert that the increase in land prices in“bubble
economy” was extraordinary. But, it was not “extraordinary”. In “bubble
economy”, that is, between1984and1991, the average urban land price index rose
by around1．66 times. However, between1955（2．19）and1962（11．1）, it rose
by around5．07 times. Between1963（13．0）and1970（30．5）, it rose by around
2．35times. Between1971（35．3）and1974（61．6）, it rose by around1．75 times.
The fact that the land prices fell gradually over the next 12 years was
“extraordinary”. Due to the first oil shock, the average urban land price index fell
from1974（61．6）to1975（58．9）, but it rose in the next year and in1978, it was
62．2. For the first time after World WarⅡ, the average urban land price index
continued to fall more than10years in“lost decade”.
What caused the increase in land prices in the late1980s ? First, we point out
the so-called the“Myth of Land”that had been firmly entrenched in the post-war
Japanese economy. From1955 to the late1980s, the real value of land increased
tremendously. It is remarkable to note that except for one year（1975）the land
price did not fall between1955and the late1980s. This spectacular increase in the
land price until the late1980s was behind the“Myth of Land”that land was an
ultimate safe asset always beating any other assets with ever-increasing prices. In
Japan land served better as collateral than any other capital goods. As we
mentioned earlier, when land is used as collateral and the banking system provides
258 松山大学論集 第28巻 第1号
credit based on collateral, the increase in the value of land raises credit availability,
and, in doing so, accelerates the increase in land prices. It is the decision of the
banks concerning credit availability that drives the price of land.
The second important factor that fueled the land price boom was the loose
monetary policy, which allegedly made money cheap and pushed money into stock
and land markets to increase prices. The rate of interest was low in the late1980s.
As long as land owners and borrowers believed that the low interest rate policy
would last for some time, the low interest rate must have accelerated the increase in
land prices.
Another important factor was the increase of real estate-related lending by
banks and other financial institutions. It was a result of the financial deregulation
that started in the late1970s. Given the“Myth of Land”and the loose monetary
policy, lending against land collateral appeared lucrative and safe. Thus, the banks
increased their loans to real estate developers, households and those collateralized by
land. This made them vulnerable to a sharp fall in land prices and sowed the seeds
for the financial crisis of the1990s（See Hoshi（2010）pp .55－56）.
5．2．Lessons from the Japanese experience
The experience of the“bubble economy”and“lost decade” that followed
provides some useful lessons on the role of the banking system and the government
policy. There is agreement that the trigger was the large stock and land prices
declines that began in early 1990s. These shocks impaired collateral values
sufficiently that any banking system would have had tremendous problems adjusting.
Because of the lack of the aggregate demand, many investments that had made
sense in the bubble economy did not make sense anymore.
Following the collapse of land prices in early1990s, Japanese banks ended up
holding a massive amount of non-performing loans. Rather than writing off those
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loans, many banks continue to extend credit to insolvent borrowers, gambling that
somehow these firms would recover or that the government would bail them out.
Failing to rollover the loans also would have sparked public criticism that banks
were worsening the recession by denying credit to needy corporations. （See Hoshi
（2006）pp .2－3）. “By keeping these unprofitable borrows（that we call“zombies”
alive, the banks allowed them to distort competition throughout the rest of the
economy. The zombies’ distortions came in many ways, including depressing
market prices for their products, raising market wages by hanging of the workers
whose productivity at the current firms declined and, more generally, congesting the
markets where they participated”（Hoshi（2006）pp .3）.
“Recapitalization was ultimately driven by macroeconomic recovery. Since
macroeconomic recover also depends on a healthy function of the financial system,
the causality runs two ways. In the Japanese case, export expansion to large and
growing economies, especially China and the U. S., contributed to the macro-
economic recover in the mid-2000s independent of the recovery of the financial
system. To the extent that macroeconomic policy can successfully stimulate the
recovery that will also help recapitalization.”（Hoshi（2008）pp .31）.
From the view point of our paper, the following experience may be useful.
First, without changing the behavior of the landowner who seeks capital gains on
land, stopping the asset（land）price boom may be dangerous even when it is
successful. Japan raised the policy interest rate and applied direct regulation on real
estate lending to stop asset price inflation. Soon after these policy changes, the
asset price not only stopped rising, but also started to decline rapidly. The
declining trend of asset prices continued for much of the following15 years. As
we stated earlier, when landowners seek capital gains on land, land prices are apt to
be unstable.
In addition, when land is used as collateral and the banking system provides
260 松山大学論集 第28巻 第1号
credit based on collateral, the instability of land prices is accelerated. It is
extremely difficult to strike the balance by changing the rate of interest and applying
direct regulation.
Turning to the question of how the government should respond to the collapse
of asset prices, the Japanese government responded to the collapse of asset prices
by expansionary macroeconomic policy. “The budget deficit, which was close to
zero in the early 1990s, was quickly expanded. The interest rate was reduced,
eventually to zero by the end of 1900s.”（Hoshi（2010） pp .68－69）. The
government deficit reached more than10％ in1999. During1990 and2000, the
huge government deficit was mainly financed by households. That is, the
household sector was the largest creditor.（See Hayashi（2010）pp .76－77.）“Since
the decline of asset prices reduced the aggregate demand through wealth and
collateral effects, the policy response was in the right direction. The problem for
Japan was that the expansionary macroeconomic policy had been aborted
prematurely.”（Hoshi（2010）pp .69）.
Second, regulatory forbearance that fails to force banks to address the non-
performing loan problem hurts economic growth by creating zombie firms.
Avoiding regulatory forbearance and cleaning up the financial system is of vital
importance.
The important question is why the decline of land prices continued so long,
bringing down the economy. Why the decline of land prices impaired collateral
values sufficiently that any banking system would have had tremendous problems
adjusting. We think that one of the main reasons is the effect of the“Myth of
Land”which had been deeply rooted in the Japanese economy and the banking
system. Between1955and1990, urban land prices rose by more than60 times（in
the metropolitan area rose by nearly130 times）, whereas the consumer price index
was increased by8 times during the same period. It is remarkable to note that
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except one year（1975）land prices continued to increase between1955 and1990.
As we mentioned earlier, land is non-reproducible, durable, alterable to other uses
and limited in supply. For these reasons, land serves better as collateral than other
capital goods. In addition, the tremendous increase in urban land prices until1990
was behind“Myth of Land”that land served an ultimate safe asset as collateral
beating any other assets with ever-increasing prices. Without the“Myth of Land”,
banks would not have had lent such a lot of money to firms including small and
medium sized ones. As we stated earlier banks provide credit based on the
collateral value of land, not the value of land itself. Even when land prices decline,
as long as banks expect the increase in land prices in the near future, the collateral
value of land will not decrease. When most of the banks expect that the decline of
land prices will continue so long that it will impair collateral values sharply, banks
are not willing to lend more. The wealth effect and collateral effect are put into the
reverse gears. The aggregate demand falls and the economy enters a contraction
phase. Because of the“Myth of Land”, there was a large time lag between the
decline of land prices and the decrease in the collateral value of land. Once the
decrease in the collateral value of land began, it accelerated the decline of land
prices and prolonged the Japanese macroeconomic stagnation that began in the early
1990s.
Another important reason is distortion in the inheritance and capital gains tax
system in Japan. There is a substantially favorable treatment for land in the
inheritance base. Land is assessed, in practice, substantially lower than their
market value. There is no such special treatment for financial assets. Their
value is assessed at the market value. There is even more favorable treatment for
farm land in the inheritance tax base（Yamazaki（1999a）, Nishimura. et al.（1999）,
Asada et al.（2002））. Nishimura. et al.（1999）says that after1975, the value of
farmland in the Tokyo metropolitan area has been, in fact, assessed based on
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agricultural income from the land if the farmer’s heir pledges to continue farming,
even though his farmland is traded as residential land in the market place. For
example, in the Tokyo metropolitan area, the assessed value of the farmland was
0．7％ of the market value in1995. Thus by pledging to continue farming, the
farmer’s heir could virtually avoid paying the inheritance tax.
As for the capital gains tax, by postponing realization until death, the capital
gains go entirely untaxed. Under the Japanese tax code, the basis of the
appreciated land value is the acquisition value of the decedents. Thus, if the heirs
sell the land, the capital gains accrued by the decedents are subject to a capital gains
tax. However, when the heirs do not sell the land, a capital gains tax is not
imposed on the heirs（Kaneko（1996）, Stigliz（2015））. In addition, the tax reform
of1993 allowed exemption of the inheritance tax payment from capital gains if the
heirs sold the land in order to pay the inheritance tax. This tax change deterred the
landowner from selling land prior to death.
Distortion in the inheritance and capital gains tax systems created an incentive
to hold land, especially agricultural land in the Urbanization Promotion Area, and in
so doing, discouraged land development and impeded efficient land use. Thus
distortion in the inheritance and capital gains tax systems prolonged the Japanese
macroeconomic stagnation that began in the early1990s.
6． Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we integrated a land asset market into the full employment
neoclassical economic growth model. We have examined the stability of the long-
run steady state path and considered the paths which do not converge to the long-run
steady state in greater detail. We have shown the following results. First, when
landowners seek capital gains on land and consume out of the capital gains, the
equilibrium point is a saddle point. Second, the instability of land prices is
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attributed to the landowners who seek capital gains on land. Third, the decline in
investment results from the assumption that landowners consume a constant fraction
of capital gains on land.
Furthermore, under the assumption of unemployment and the lack of aggregate
demand, we described the link between credit, collateral, land prices and capital
accumulation. As long as unemployment and the lack of aggregate demand persist,
an increase in credit leading to an increase in the value of land can initially lead to
more investment, and contribute to the expansion of the aggregate demand. But,
when the economy reaches a full employment, increased consumption due to the
increase in the value of land crowds out investment, and investment declines, even
though wealth（the capital stock ＋ the value of land）continues to increase. As
long as banks expect that a boom continues, the value of land as collateral increases.
And land as collateral accelerates the increase in land prices. But a boom does not
last perpetually. When a boom or bubble collapses, land as collateral accelerates
the decrease in land prices. For these reasons, it may be not so unrealistic to say
that land collateral contributes to volatility of land prices.
Finally, we considered what we could learn from the Japanese experience from
1986 to 2003. From the view point of the behavior of land prices,“bubble
economy”and“lost decade”are characterized not by the fact that the increase in
land prices in“bubble economy”was high, but by the fact that the land prices fell
gradually over the next12years. From the view point of our paper, the following
Japanese experience provides useful lessons. First, without changing the behavior
of the landowner who seeks capital gains on land, stopping the land price boom may
be dangerous even when it is successful. Second, regulatory forbearance that fails
to force banks to address the non-performing loan problem hurts economic growth
by creating zombie firms. Avoiding regulatory forbearance and cleaning up the
financial system is of vital importance.
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Third, distortion in the inheritance and capital gains tax system prolonged the
Japanese macroeconomic stagnation that began in the early 1990s. Improving
distortion in the inheritance and capital gains tax systems is of vital importance.
Two extensions of our model are being considered. First, we have described
the link between credit, collateral, land prices and capital accumulation. But, we
did incorporate these factors into the growth model. Incorporating these factors into
the growth model, and examining the effects of these factors on the growth paths
are left for future research. Second, we disregard the effects of the capital gains tax
on the steady state price of land, capital accumulation and the stability of the
system. The effects of the capital gains tax on a capital gains-seeking economy are
an interesting research topic for the future.
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